Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions by Archishman Chakraborty et al.
Ordinal cheap talk in
common value auctions∗
Archishman Chakraborty† Nandini Gupta‡ Rick Harbaugh§
December, 2002
Abstract
Sellers beneﬁt on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but
the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple
goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or
partial ordering of the diﬀerent goods by value, can be credible. Ordinal statements are not
susceptible to exaggeration because they simultaneously reveal favorable information about
some goods and unfavorable information about other goods. Any informative ordering
increases revenues in accordance with the linkage principle, and the complete ordering
is asymptotically revenue-equivalent to full revelation as the number of goods becomes
large. These results provide a new explanation in addition to bundling, versioning, and
complementarities for how a seller beneﬁts from the sale of multiple goods.
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When can a seller credibly reveal information to buyers? The linkage principle (Milgrom and
Weber, 1982) shows that such revelation strengthens competition and, on average, increases
seller revenues by narrowing information diﬀerences among buyers. But the importance of the
linkage principle would seem limited by the seller’s incentive to only reveal good information or
even lie about bad information. It is usually assumed that the credibility of seller information,
and the applicability of the linkage principle, depends on the seller’s incentive to maintain a
trustworthy reputation over time.1
We show that the credibility problem is less severe than normally supposed when a seller has
multiple goods. Although the seller has an incentive to lie about the value of each individual
good, cheap talk about the comparative values of the goods is often credible. For instance, an
auction house can credibly rank the likely values of diﬀerent goods even if absolute estimates
are not credible. Comparative statements can be part of an equilibrium strategy because they
simultaneously reveal favorable information about one good and unfavorable information about
another good. The incentive to lie is thereby diminished, and in many situations is completely
eliminated.
To investigate this issue formally we consider simultaneous, common value auctions of
stochastically equivalent and independently distributed goods by an informed seller. For each
of the goods there is a set of diﬀerent buyers who each have a private signal about the value
of the good and are interested only in that good. Before the auctions the seller publicly makes
a cheap talk statement to all the buyers about the comparative values of the diﬀerent goods.
This statement may disclose a complete ordering of the goods according to her own private
signal, or a partial ordering in which multiple goods are grouped into the same categories.
When the seller’s information is a complement to the buyers’ signals in determining buyer
valuations, the seller has an incentive to sell a better good precisely when the buyers are
expecting a better good. We show that this simple condition is necessary and suﬃcient to
make ordinal cheap talk by the seller credible. For a suﬃciently large number of goods we
ﬁnd that an ordinal cheap talk equilibrium involving a partial ordering always exists under
standard conditions. We then provide a simple and natural class of auctions where revealing
1Of course, legal restrictions or contractual obligations may also provide an incentive for truthfulness, but
the private nature of seller information makes veriﬁcation inherently diﬃcult. Moreover, common law has long
protected “puﬀery” — the right of sellers to boast about their goods.
1a complete ordering of the goods is always an equilibrium for any number of goods.
We ﬁnd that the revenue gains from comparative cheap talk can be substantial and that,
consistent with the linkage principle, ﬁner comparisons imply higher revenue. Moreover, as the
number of goods increases, revealing the seller’s complete ordering is asymptotically equivalent
to revealing all of the seller’s private information. In a common values auction with a perfectly
informed seller, buyer information rents therefo r eg ot oz e r o .T h i sl i m i tr e s u l ti sd i s t i n c tf r o m
other recent results in the auction literature. Bali and Jackson (2002) ﬁnd that as the number
of bidders for a good increases, buyer information rents disappear in the limit for all standard
auction formats. Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000) ﬁnd that for a uniform price auction with
identical goods, the auction is eﬃcient in the limit as the number of goods and buyers goes to
inﬁnity in a bounded ratio with more buyers than goods. In both these models the competition
between buyers is the driving force in eliminating buyer information rents. In our model there
is a ﬁxed number of buyers who bid for each good. Buyer information rents fall purely because
of credible revelation of the seller’s information.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that limited cheap talk statements are often credible when
sender and receiver interests are neither directly opposed nor directly aligned. While the sender
still has an incentive to lie about the absolute value of an unknown parameter, the sender can
reveal to the other party an interval in which the unknown parameter lies, provided sender and
receiver interests are suﬃciently aligned. For instance, the seller can state that the parameter
is above or below some level. In our model the buyers for each good and the seller have directly
opposing interests so the seller always has an incentive to exaggerate the value of the good and
such interval cheap talk is not credible.2
While interval cheap talk in the sense of Crawford and Sobel is not possible, there still exist
informative equilibria that are partitional in the space of the common values of the goods, with
diﬀerent elements of the partition diﬀering only in the ordinal nature of the information they
convey. These equilibria are distinct from those in Crawford and Sobel because they are limited
to ordinal information and because each element of a partition must contain at least one good.
For instance, a seller cannot state that two goods are both above average but can state that
one good is better than another good.
The ability to make credible comparisons provides a new explanation in addition to bundling,
2Farrell and Gibbons (1989) show that cheap talk is possible with otherwise opposing interests when there
are costs to trading. For instance a potential buyer might reveal a strong interest in a good to a seller so as to
persuade the seller that it is worth the trouble of bargaining.
2complementarities, and versioning for how a single seller beneﬁts from the sale of multiple
goods. The bundling literature shows that selling multiple goods as a package can be used to
reduce variation in buyer demands (McAﬀee, McMillan, and Whinston, 1989) or restrict entry
by sellers of single products (Nalebuﬀ, 2000). The combinatorial auctions literature shows that
simultaneous auctions can be designed to take advantage of complementarities across goods
(Rassenti, Smith, and Bulﬁn, 1982). These factors are not present in our model because each
buyer demands only one good. More relatedly, the versioning literature shows how selling
multiple goods of varying quality allows a monopolist to discriminate among diﬀerent buyers
(Varian, 1989). In our model there is no such advantage since buyers do not vary in their taste
for quality. The gains we identify are therefore entirely due to reductions in buyer information
rents via the linkage principle.
The seller in our model could be the actual owner of multiple goods, a separate evaluator
of the goods whose earnings are dependent on overall sales, or an auction house that sells
goods on behalf of diﬀerent owners. In the last case the auction house’s private information
could be in the form of background information about the owners. For instance, on-line
auction houses have feedback mechanisms that accumulate information about the performance
of sellers, but the design of these mechanisms appears to induce overly positive reports (Resnick
and Zeckhauser, 2001). This paper shows that the relative performance scores of diﬀerent sellers
can be credible even when the absolute scores are not.
In Section 2 we set up the model and in Section 3 we consider ordinal cheap talk equilibria.
In Section 3.1 we provide a result on the existence of one informative equilibria, while in Section
3 . 2w ec h a r a c t e r i z ed i ﬀerent ordinal cheap talk strategies in terms of their revenues. In Section
4 we provide two simple special cases of our general model. Section 5 concludes while the
Appendix contains some of the proofs.
2 The Model
As e l l e rh a sN ≥ 2d i ﬀerent goods indexed by k ∈ {1,...,N}. For each good k the seller observes
the value of the good, Vk ∈ [0,1]. Let V ∈ [0,1]N represent the vector of values for the goods.
Let Vk:N denote the k—th lowest value (i.e., the kth order statistic) with V1:N ≤ ... ≤ VN:N.
We suppose that for each good k there are n ≥ 2 buyers, indexed by ik ∈ {1,...,n}.T h e
utility for buyer ik from obtaining good k at a price p is equal to Vk −p and the sets of buyers
for any two goods are disjoint. Each buyer ik has a private signal about good k, Xik ∈ [0,1]
3for ik ∈ {1,...,n}.D e n o t eb yXk =( Xik,...,X nk) the vector of buyer signals for good k.
We suppose that the random variables (Xk,V k) are independently and identically distrib-
uted across k ∈ {1,...,N}.L e t F denote the joint distribution of (Xk,V k). Following Milgrom
and Weber (1982), hereafter MW, we assume that F is symmetric in its ﬁrst n arguments
a n dt h a ti td i s p l a y sa ﬃliation. Aﬃliation implies if one player (including the seller) observes
a high private signal of the value of a good, other players are also more likely to observe high
private signals of the value of that good. When F has a density f,a ﬃliation implies that
f is log—supermodular in its arguments. In the appendix we provide a general deﬁnition of
aﬃliation.
Let FV denote the marginal distribution of Vk. We suppose that either FV admits a positive
density fV with compact support V = {v|fV (v) > 0} or that FV is a step function, i.e., Vk
takes ﬁnitely many values and fV (v)=P r [ Vk = v]. For each v ∈ V,l e tFX|V (·|v)d e n o t e
the distribution of Xk conditional on Vk = v. We suppose that either FX|V (·|v)a d m i t sa
positive density fX|V (.|v)f o re a c hv or that FX|V (·|v) is a step function for each v.I n t h e
latter case, Xk takes a ﬁnite number of values with fX|V (x|v)=P r [ Xk = x|Vk = v]. For each
v ∈ V,l e tX(v)={x|fX|V (x|v) > 0} denote the support of fX|V (·|v) (that may depend on
v). Finally, assume that fX|V (·|v) is a bounded function of v with at most a ﬁnite number of
discontinuities.
The seller sells the goods in the form of N simultaneous “English” or continuous ascending
clock auctions to the N diﬀerent groups of buyers.3 Formally, such an auction consists of a
price p ∈ [0,1] rising continuously from 0 to 1. At any price p, each buyer has to decide whether
to remain active or drop out after observing the number of previously active bidders and when
other bidders have dropped out. Drop outs are ﬁnal. Let ι(p) ∈ {1,...,n} be the number of
bidders who are active at p.L e tpik be the price at which ik drops out (with pik set equal to
1i fik never drops out). The winner of the auction is the bidder with the maximum pik,w i t h
ties being decided uniformly. The price P that the winner pays is equal to inf{p|ι(p) ≤ 1} if it
exists, and is equal to 1 otherwise.
Since the auctions are simultaneously held, none of the buyers in any auction observe any
of the proceedings of any other auction. The only possible information transmission between
auctions takes the form of a public announcement sent by the seller before the auctions start.
The seller’s announcement strategy is represented as a function m(V ) choosing a message (or
3We do not consider the optimality of the English auction nor other mechanism design issues such as reserve
prices and entry fees.
4a probability distribution over messages) from a ﬁnite set M (with at least N!e l e m e n t s ) ,a s
a function of her private information V. We ignore reputational considerations, so that the
seller’s announcement is pure cheap talk and the seller is only interested in maximizing her
total revenues from the N auctions.
Recall that we assume separate sets of buyers for each good. In practice, there will often be
some overlap between buyers in which case neither our assumption of disjoint buyer sets nor
the more common assumption of identical buyer sets will hold. Separation is most likely when
the goods are of diﬀerent types, e.g., a government privatizes a number of ﬁrms in diﬀerent
industries and buyers are industry-speciﬁc, or an on-line auction house sells a range of diﬀerent
goods and buyers are interested in a speciﬁc good. Use of disjoint buyer sets greatly simpliﬁes
the analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior and also highlights the fact that the gains we
identify from selling multiple goods are not due to increased competition from a corresponding
increase in buyers for each good, nor to strategies such as bundling that depend on each buyer
having an interest in multiple goods, but are exclusively due to cheap talk by the seller.
3 Ordinal Cheap Talk
3.1 Existence of Equilibrium
An equilibrium for our cheap talk and bidding game consists of an announcement strategy
m(V ) for the seller and bidding strategies for each buyer of each good such that: given the
message m, the bidding strategies constitute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
auction for each good k; and, given the bidding strategies, the seller’s announcement strategy
maximizes her expected revenues for each possible realization of V .
A full characterization of the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for English auctions is
found in MW.4 In brief, the bidding proceeds in two stages. In stage 1, the n − 2 bidders
with the lowest signals successively drop out at points pik that depend on their private signals,
enabling the two remaining bidders to infer their signals. In stage 2, each of the two remaining
bidders drop out at the point p reaches the expected value of the good conditional on the
(inferred) values of the lowest n − 2 signals, the message m sent by the seller, and on the fact
4W h i l et h ea n a l y s i si nM Wi sc a r r i e do u tf o rt h ec a s ew h e r et h eb u y e rs i g n a l sXik are continuous random
variables admitting a density (so that ties are zero probability events), it is straightforward to check that their
analysis carries over to the case of discrete buyer signals when the seller employs an English auction in the sense
deﬁned above.
5that the buyer is tied for the highest signal. Notice that when n = 2 this is equivalent to
equilibrium bidding behavior in a second price auction.
For ik =1 ,...,n, let Yik be the i—th highest signal among the n signals of the buyers of
good k and let Zik =( Yik,...,Y nk). When the value of the second highest signal is y2 and the
value of the lowest n−2 signals is equal to (the vector) z3, the bidder with the second highest
signal will drop out at the point bm(y2,z 3)d e ﬁned by:
bm(y2,z 3)=E[Vk|Y1k = Y2k = y2,Z 3k = z3,m]. (1)
It may seem that the expectation in (1) may not be well—deﬁned if the seller’s message m is
inconsistent with the buyer signal(s) Xk.5 However, for the set of cheap talk equilibria that
we focus on, where the seller only discloses ordinal information, such a possibility never arises,
as the distribution of Vk given any message m always enjoys the same support as the prior
distribution of Vk. Furthermore, for each ordinal message m, our assumptions imply that the
function bm is non—decreasing in each argument. Let Pm,k be the price that the seller receives
for good k given a message m.S i n c eZ2k =( Y2k,Z 3k), we can write
Pm,k = bm(Z2k). (2)
We now turn to considering the seller’s announcement strategies m(V )t h a tm a yc o n s t i t u t e
a cheap talk equilibrium. As is usual in cheap talk games, there always exists one uninformative
or babbling equilibrium where the buyers ascribe no meaning to the seller’s announcement, so
that the seller does not send any informative message. For the babbling case we will denote
by bu(·) the function in (1) that deﬁnes the price at which the bidder with the second highest
signal drops out, regardless of the seller’s message m. Since bu does not depend on the seller’s
message,
bu(y2,z 3)=E[Vk|Y1k = Y2k = y2,Z 3k = z3]. (3)
Denote by Pu,k = bu(Z2,k) the price that the seller obtains for good k in a babbling equilibrium.
Regarding informative equilibria, note that since buyer and seller interests are directly
opposed on each good, there is no room for cheap talk that refers to the value of each good
independently of the value of other goods. We are interested in the possibility of cheap talk
equilibria where the seller’s message consists of disclosing a partial or complete order of the
5This may occur when, for example, the seller has announced that the value of the good is equal to 1 and
the buyer knows from his signal that the value of the good is less than 1 with probability 1.
6values V1,...,V N of his N goods. Such a message contains information about each good that
is not independent of the information it contains about other goods. We call such strategies
ordinal cheap talk strategies and such equilibria, if they exist, ordinal cheap talk equilibria.
Formally, let CN =( c1,...,c J) denote an ordering of the N goods into J ∈ {1,...,N}
elements or categories such that category j =1 ,...,J contains cj ∈ {1,...,N} goods with
P
j cj = N.F o rj =1 ,...,J,let ψj =
Pj
j0=1 cj0 be the number of goods in or below category j,
with ψ0 =0 .
The ordinal cheap talk strategy that corresponds to the ordering CN is described as follows.
For each realization of V , the seller announces that the c1 goods with the lowest values belong
to category 1, the next c2 goods belong to category 2, and so on. If there are ties between
some of the Vk’s, the seller uniformly randomizes when she sorts those goods into diﬀerent
categories. Consequently, buyers know that goods in higher categories have a weakly higher
value and cannot distinguish between goods within a category based on the seller’s message.
In the rest of this paper we will denote an ordinal cheap talk strategy by the corresponding
ordering CN. Note that such a strategy consists of a partition of VN.T h e p a r t i t i o n h a s
N!/
Q
j(cj!) elements, each element corresponding to one way of sorting the N goods into the
categories speciﬁed by CN. We emphasize that the ordering CN itself is ﬁxed and does not
depend on the realization of V. When buyers believe that the seller’s announcement strategy
is given by CN, we assume that to each message m ∈ M they ascribe a unique meaning
corresponding to one element of the partition of VN that is generated by CN, thus ruling out
the possibility of out—of—equilibrium messages.
Given N, we will say that an ordering CN is ﬁner than an ordering C0
N if it is a ﬁner
partition of VN in the usual sense of partitions. The ﬁnest possible ordering, denoted by C∗
N,
is when the seller completely orders her N goods, i.e., J = N and cj =1f o ra l lj. On the
other hand, the coarsest possible ordering, denoted by Cu
N,h a sJ = 1 and corresponds to
the uninformative babbling equilibrium discussed above. Note that every ordinal cheap talk
strategy CN 6= Cu
N is informative about Vk for all k.
For any ordering CN, when the seller announces that good k belongs to category j, the
buyers of good k know that the value of good k is equally likely to be one of the cj order statistics
{Vψj−1+1:N,...,V ψj:N}. Let Fj:CN be the distribution of good k when the seller announces that
good k belongs to category j. Due to our symmetry and independence assumptions Fj:CN does
not depend on k. We will denote by Vj:CN the random variable that has distribution Fj:CN,
with V j:CN = E[Vj:CN]. Note from the deﬁnition of CN that V j:CN is increasing in j.
7Similarly, using (1), (2) and our symmetry assumptions, we let Pj:CN = bj:CN(Z2,k)d e n o t e
the price that the seller obtains when her message m implies that good k belongs to category
j. By aﬃliation and the deﬁnition of CN,E [Pj:CN|Vk = v] is non—decreasing in v and j. The
following lemma provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an ordinal cheap talk strategy
characterized by an ordering CN to be an equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The ordering CN =( c1,...,c J) is an equilibrium if and only if for all v,v0 with
v>v 0
E[Pj:CN|Vk = v] − E[Pj:CN|Vk = v0] is non—decreasing in j ∈ {1,...,J}. (4)
Proof. Necessity is immediate: if there existed j,j0 with j>j 0 such that
E[Pj:CN|Vk = v] − E[Pj:CN|Vk = v0] <E [Pj0:CN|Vk = v] − E[Pj0:CN|Vk = v0]( 5 )
for some v,v0 with v>v 0, then for a realization of V such that Vk = v>V k0 = v0 and such
that good k should be in category j and good k0 in category j0, the seller would do better to
announce that k is in category j0 and k0 in j, keeping the rest of her announcement unchanged.
To show suﬃciency, consider any subset of L ≤ N goods, indexed by kl,l=1 ,...,L,such
that Vk1 ≤ ... ≤ VkL. Fixing the categories announced for the other N − L goods, suppose
that {jl}L
l=1 are the categories the seller has available to announce for the L remaining goods,
with j1 ≤ ... ≤ jL. We show by induction on L that she would want to announce the highest
possible category jL for good kL, and so on, announcing category j1 for good k1.F o rL =2 ,
this is identical to (4).
Suppose as the inductive hypothesis that the claim is true for L − 1 and observe that the
expected revenues from the L goods, from announcing a category other than jl∗ 6= jL for good











by (4). Thus, it is weakly optimal for the seller to announce category jL for good kL.B yt h e
inductive hypothesis, it is weakly optimal to put good kL−1 in category jL−1, and so on, so
that the suﬃciency of (4) follows.
8The ‘increasing diﬀerence’ condition in Lemma 1 for the existence of an ordinal cheap talk
equilibrium captures an information complementarity between buyer valuations and the seller’s
information. It says that the gain in expected revenue from selling a higher-valued good in any
auction must be non-decreasing in how optimistic the buyers are in that auction, given the
seller’s message. Such a condition is necessary and suﬃcient for the seller to announce higher
categories for her better goods and lower categories for her worse goods.
In general, whether or not an informative ordinal cheap talk equilibrium exists depends on
the structure of information held by the buyers and the seller.6 T h en e x tr e s u l ts h o w st h a to n e
such equilibrium always exists for a large enough number of goods provided that the monotone
likelihood ratio property implied by aﬃliation holds strictly rather than just weakly, that the
support of the buyer signals is the same for all values of the goods, and that either the set of
possible buyer signals or the set of possible values of the goods has a ﬁnite number of elements.
Theorem 1 Suppose that for all v,v0 ∈ V with v>v 0, X(v)=X(v0)=X and further
fX|V (x|v)
fX|V (x|v0) is strictly increasing in x ∈ X. Then if either V is ﬁnite or X is ﬁnite, there exists
N such that for each N>N the set of informative equilibrium orderings is non—empty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive and proceeds by considering, for each N,a no r d e r i n g
CN =( 1 ,N− 1) so that the goods are divided into two categories with 1 good in the lower
category and N − 1 goods in the higher category. For such an ordering, as N becomes large,
buyers become more and more certain that the good in the lower category is likely to be of
the lowest possible value and bid accordingly, regardless of their signals and the actual value
of the good. However, as N becomes large, buyers do not have such strong beliefs about
a good in the higher category since almost all of the goods are in that category and the
probability distribution for the value of a good in the higher category therefore approaches the
prior distribution. As a result, buyers pay more attention to their own private signals and on
average bid more for a good that is better. Since the impact on prices from selling a better
good is greater for the higher category, the increasing diﬀerence condition (4) is satisﬁed.7
6It also depends on other factors such as the auction format and on the number of bidders for each auction,
but the necessary and suﬃcient condition (4) remains unchanged.
7In the proof of Theorem 1, the ﬁniteness of V is used to guarantee a lower bound on the left—hand side and
an upper bound on the right—hand side of (4) that are both independent of v and v
0, guaranteeing that for N
large enough (4) holds for all v,v
0.W h e nV is a continuous random variable, one can achieve the same end if
X is ﬁnite.
9The argument underlying Theorem 1 also applies when the lower category has any ﬁxed
number c1 of goods and N becomes large. More generally, the existence of an equilibrium does
not require that there be only two categories or that N is large. In Section 4 we consider two
examples of our general model where the set of informative ordinal cheap talk equilibria is
quite large even for small N.B u tﬁrst we investigate the expected revenues from informative
ordinal cheap talk strategies.
3.2 Revenues
Informative cheap talk equilibria are especially interesting because of their beneﬁcial eﬀect on
ex—ante expected revenues via the linkage principle. Consider an ordering CN =( c1,...,c J)
and let R(CN) be the seller’s per—good ex—ante expected revenue when she uses the ordering







Note that when CN is an equilibrium ordering, R(CN) is the seller’s equilibrium expected
revenue.
The next result states that ﬁner orderings lead to higher expected revenues. It implies
that the expected revenues from any informative ordinal cheap talk equilibrium is higher than
R(Cu
N), the expected revenue from the uninformative babbling equilibrium. The result follows
from a direct application of Theorem 13 in MW.8
Theorem 2 If CN is ﬁner than C0
N then R(CN) ≥ R(C0
N).
We now consider the complete ordering C∗
N and show that as the number of goods N
becomes large, the per—good expected revenues converge to V,the ex—ante expected value of
each good. In other words, in the limit, the seller obtains the same revenue as she would from
being able to fully disclose her information.
Theorem 3 For the complete ordering C∗
N, limN→∞ R(C∗
N)=V .
Proof. See the Appendix.
8S e ea l s of o o t n o t e4 .
10For example, suppose that Vk is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. When buyers know the
complete ordering of the goods, for a large number of goods it is almost sure that the value of
the highest ranked good is close to 1, and that the value of the lowest ranked good is close to 0.
Because of this increased certainty, buyers will be willing to bid close to 1 and 0 respectively for
the two goods, regardless of their private signals, so that the prices will also be close to 1 and
0, respectively. Theorem 3 uses the Glivenko—Cantelli Theorem and shows that this same logic
applies along the entire distribution– for any p ∈ (0,1), if there are N goods, then the value of
the pN—th good is likely to be very close to p as N becomes large, and buyers will pay close to
that value. As the number of goods increases, buyers become more and more certain that the
ranking of the good narrowly constrains the good’s likely value so that per—good information
rents converge to zero.
Our last result of this section considers partial orderings CN that asymptotically yield
expected revenue equal to V as the number of goods becomes large when V is ﬁnite, i.e.,
Vk ∈ {v1,...,v H} with Pr[Vk = vh]=λh ∈ (0,1) for h =1 ,...,H. (7)
For each N consider the ordering CN =( cN
1 ,...,c N






= λh for h =1 ,...,H. (8)
In other words, CN orders the goods into H categories, with the number of goods in each
category h ≥ 1 being in proportion (asymptotically) to the probability that Vk take its hth
value. As N becomes large, the probability that a good in the h—th category takes the value
vh becomes arbitrarily close to 1. This implies that information rents vanish for each good and
asymptotic revenues equal V.
Theorem 4 Assume (7). For any sequence of orderings {CN}N satisfying (8), limN→∞ R(CN)=
V.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Two Special Cases
In view of Theorems 3 and 4, it is of interest to identify models where the set of ordinal
cheap talk equilibria is large and includes, in particular, the complete ordering C∗
N or the
11asymptotically revenue-equivalent partial orderings characterized by (8). In this section, we
develop two simple special cases of our general model above with these properties. In the ﬁrst
case, we impose restrictions on the nature of signals that the buyers for each good can possess
while keeping the seller’s information unrestricted. In the second case, we do the opposite.
4.1 Informed/Uninformed Buyers
Let FV be as before but suppose that each buyer ik knows Vk with probability β ∈ (0,1)
a n dh a sn oi n f o r m a t i o nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1− β. The probability that any buyer is informed is
independent across buyers. It is straightforward to check that such a structure satisﬁes all the
assumptions of the model.
For any candidate equilibrium ordering CN, recall that V j:CN is the expected value of
a good that belongs to category j. The following bidding behavior constitutes a symmetric
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the auction for any good k that belongs to category j according
to the seller’s announcement, as can be easily checked.
Any informed bidder ik who knows Vk = v drops out with probability 1 when the price
p ≥ v and remains active with probability 1 for all p<vregardless of how many other
bidders are or have been active. Any bidder ik who is uninformed drops out with probability
1 whenever the number of active bidders ι(p)i sl e s st h a nn, or whenever the price p ≥ V j:CN,
and stays active with probability 1 otherwise.
As a result, when Vk ≥ V j:CN the seller obtains a price equal to V j:CN when at most 1
out of n bidders are informed, and obtains a price equal to Vk otherwise. On the other hand,
when Vk < V j:CN, the seller obtains a price equal to V j:CN when no bidder is informed, and
obtains a price equal to Vk otherwise. Thus,
E[Pj:CN|Vk]=
(
(1 − Π)Vk + ΠV j:CN if Vk ≥ V j:CN
(1 − π)Vk + πV j:CN if Vk < V j:CN
(9)
where π =( 1− β)n is the probability that none of the n bidders is informed and Π = π +
nβ(1 − β)n−1 is the probability that at most 1 of the n bidders is informed.
Proposition 1 In the informed/uninformed buyer model, for each N, any ordering CN is an
equilibrium.
12Figure 1: Informed/uninformed buyer model, n =2 ,Vk ∼ U[0,1], β =1 /2.
Proof. Pick an ordering CN and categories j,j0 with j>j 0. Since V j:CN > V j0:CN, we observe
from (9) that for any v,




π(V j:CN − V j0:CN)i f v< V j0:CN
(Π − π)v + πV j:CN − ΠV j0:CN if V j0:CN ≤ v<V j:CN
Π(V j:CN − V j0:CN)i f V j:CN ≤ v
(10)
Since Π >πthe expression above is non—decreasing in v. But this is equivalent to (4) so that
CN is an equilibrium ordering.
Proposition 1 implies that the full ordering C∗
N is an equilibrium for every N.T h u s t h e
asymptotic revenue result from Theorem 3 is relevant. Figure 1 shows the per—good ex—ante
expected revenues as a function of the number of goods N when there are two bidders for each
good (n =2 ) ,FV is the uniform distribution on [0,1], and the probability β that a bidder
is informed is equal to 1
2. For the uniform distribution, V k:C∗
N = k
N+1 for k =1 ,...,N.T h e
average price under full revelation for any number of goods is the expected value of the good,
1
2. Of course, such revelation is not credible in this example nor more generally. If the seller
does not make any credible statements then the per—good expected revenue is just .4375 for
13any number of goods. Under ordinal cheap talk with a complete ordering the price rises to
.4506 for 2 goods and continues to rise with the number of goods. Buyer information rents, as
represented by the diﬀerence in the expected value and the expected price, fall by over 50%
for six goods and by over 80% for 100 goods.
4.2 Binary Seller Information
Suppose that Vk ∈ {0,1} where Pr[Vk =1 ]=λ ∈ (0,1) for k ∈ {1,...,N}. Suppose also that
X(v)=X for all v ∈ {0,1} and that the likelihood ratio of buyer signals conditional on Vk is
bounded:






CN =( c1,c 2) such that c2 ≥ λN. (12)
Let λj:CN =P r [ Vj:CN =1 ]f o rj =1 ,2. Note that λ1:CN = E[max{0, Y −c2
c1 }]a n dλ2:CN =
E[min{1, Y
c2}]w h e r eY is a binomial random variable with parameters λ and N.W eh a v et h e
following result.
Proposition 2 Consider the binary seller information model with (11) and suppose that λ ≤
1
1+l
2. Then for all N such that λN is an integer, any ordering CN satisfying (12) is an
equilibrium. Further, there exists N such that for all N>N any ordering CN satisfying (12)
is an equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The orderings given by (12) contain those covered by Theorem 4, e.g., the ordering with
c2 = dλNe. Consequently, in the binary signal model with (11) and λ low enough, there
exists an ordinal cheap talk equilibrium with the property that per—good expected revenues
are approximately equal to V , the ex—ante expected value, when the seller has a large number
of goods.
In the rest of this section we consider an example of this model where we can explicitly solve
for equilibrium bids and where we can strengthen the conclusions of Proposition 2. Suppose
that there are two buyers for each good, and each buyer gets a binary signal Xik ∈ {0,1}, with




14The buyers’ signals are independent conditional on the value of the good. Note that condition




With two bidders, in the symmetric equilibrium of the English (equivalently, second price)
auction, each bidder bids the probability that the good has value 1 conditional on his own
signal Xik = x, on the other bidder having the same signal, and on the announced category for
the good. Consider an ordering CN =( c1,c 2) that divides the goods into two categories with
λj:CN being the probability that Vk =1g i v e nt h a ti ti si nc a t e g o r yj ∈ {1,2}. Let bj:CN(x)=
Pr[Vk =1 |X1k = x = X2k] be the equilibrium bid of a buyer with signal x ∈ {0,1},when the
seller has announced that the good is in category j :
bj:CN(1) =
β2λj:CN





(1 − β)2λj:CN + β2(1 − λj:CN)
(15)
Note that the high bid is received only when both buyers have a high signal. Therefore,
E[Pj:CN|Vk =1 ] = β2bj:CN(1) + (1 − β2)bj:CN(0)
E[Pj:CN|Vk =0 ] = ( 1 − β)2bj:CN(1) + (1 − (1 − β)2)bj:CN(0).
It is straightforward to check that in this model the necessary and suﬃcient condition (4) for
the existence of equilibrium reduces to the simple condition
λ1:CN + λ2:CN ≤ 1 (16)
that is independent of β. Furthermore, since both λ1:CN and λ2:CN are decreasing in c2, there
exists a cutoﬀ value c2 (depending on λ and N) such that the ordering CN =( c1,c 2)i sa n
equilibrium if and only if c2 ≥ c2. The following result shows that for this example Proposition
2 can be considerably strengthened.
Proposition 3 Consider the binary seller information model with n =2and buyer signals
satisfying (13). There exists an equilibrium sequence of orderings CN =( cN
1 ,c N





Proof. For this case λ1:CN +λ2:CN ≤ 1 (equivalently,
1−λ2:CN
λ1:CN
≥ 1) is necessary and suﬃcient
for an ordering CN =( cN
1 ,c N
2 ) to be an equilibrium. For λ ≤ 1
2,l e tcN
2 = dλNe (i.e., the
15smallest integer at least as high as λN) and note that since λ1:CN ≤ λ2:CN, by symmetry and























This proves the result for λ ≤ 1
2.
Now consider λ>1
2. From Theorem 1, we are guaranteed the existence of a two category
informative ordering CN =( 1 ,N−1) for N large enough. For each such N, let CN =( cN
1 ,cN
2 )
be the informative ordering with the lowest value of cN
2 . Using arguments similar to those used
for establishing (18), we see that cN







N ∈ [0,1] for each N, there exists ε>0 and a convergent subsequence











Nr < 1−λ, by the Law of Large Numbers it follows that limr→∞ λ1:e CNr =0 .
Furthermore, since for each Nr, e CNr is not an equilibrium ordering we must have
λ1:e CNr + λ2:e CNr > 1 (19)






















Nr , this establishes a
contradiction, completing the proof.
Proposition 3 shows that we are guaranteed the existence of a sequence of equilibrium
orderings for which Theorem 4 applies. Figure 2 plots the expected per—good revenue from the
ordering CN =( N − dλNe,dλNe)w h e nλ = 1
2 and β = 3
4 as N varies. In the no information
or “babbling” case buyers are very unsure whether a good is high or low value, and so each
bidder reduces their bid out of fear of the winner’s curse. The expected price of .35 is therefore
substantially below the expected value of λ = 1
2. Categorizing the goods based on their relative
values increases revenues. As the number of goods increases, the probability that a good in
the low category has value 0 rises as does the probability that a good in the high category has
value 1. Buyers are therefore more and more conﬁdent of the likely value of each good, so
competition intensiﬁes and buyer information rents fall.
16Figure 2: Binary seller information model, n =2 ,Vk ∈ {0,1}, λ =1 /2, β =1 /2.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Sellers often make comparative statements about the values of their goods. In a multi-object
auction, we show that such statements can be credible even though full revelation of the
seller’s information is not. As a result, buyer information rents fall and seller revenues rise
in accordance with the linkage principle. Moreover, seller revenues asymptotically approach
revenues under full revelation as the number of goods increases.
Ordinal cheap talk also has applications to related non-auction selling environments. For
instance, a salesperson might have information regarding what good is better for a particular
buyer. The buyer might be suspicious of the salesperson’s claims about the value of each good,
but might still believe claims that one good is likely to be preferred over another. Similarly, in
ﬁnancial markets, an analyst’s claims about the likely returns to a stock might not be credible,
but the statement that one stock is a better bet than another might be.
176A p p e n d i x
Deﬁnition of Aﬃliation
A subset S of Rn is a sub—lattice if, whenever x,x0 ∈ S, so are their component—wise
maximum (meet) and component—wise minimum (join). The indicator function 1A(x)o fa n y
subset A of Rn is deﬁned to be equal to 1 if x ∈ A and equal to 0 otherwise. A set A is increasing
if its indicator function is non—decreasing. Let X =( X1,...,Xn) be a random n—vector with
probability distribution P (i.e., P(A)=P r [ X ∈ A]).
Deﬁnition 1 X1,....,Xn are aﬃliated if for all increasing sets A and B and every sub—lattice
S, P[A ∩ B|S] ≥ P[A|S]P[B|S].
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
For each N, consider the ordering CN =( 1 ,N − 1). Let vmin =m i n V. N o t et h a ta s
N becomes large V1:CN converges almost surely to vmin and V2:CN converges in distribution
to Vk.G i v e n t h a t X(v)=X for each v ∈ V, as well as the assumed properties of FV and
FX|V , it follows that for each z2 =( y2,z 3),b 1:CN(z2) converges to vmin and b2:CN(z2)c o n v e r g e s
to bu(z2), where bu(z2)i sd e ﬁned in (3). Furthermore, the strict monotone likelihood ratio
condition assumed in the statement of the theorem implies that bu(z2) is strictly increasing in
its arguments and that E[bu(Z2,k)|Vk = v] is strictly increasing in v.
Suppose ﬁrst that V is ﬁnite. Since Pj:CN = bj:CN(Z2,k)f o rj =1 ,2 it follows that there
exists ε ≥ 0a n dN such that for all N>N,
max
v>v0{E[P1:CN|Vk = v]−E[P1:CN|Vk = v0]} ≤ min




v>v0{E[bu(Z2,k)|Vk = v]−E[bu(Z2,k)|Vk = v0]}−ε ≤ min
v>v0{E[P2:CN|Vk = v]−E[P2:CN|Vk = v0]}.
(22)
But then (4) holds.





2)} >ε . (23)
9Following usual convention, the inequality z2 >z
0
2 allows the vectors z2 and z
0
2 to be identical in some but
not all components.
18Observe that since Pj:CN = bj:CN(Z2,k)f o rj =1 ,2, condition (4) can be rewritten as
E[b2:CN(Z2,k) − b1:CN(Z2,k)|Vk = v] is non—decreasing in v. (24)
To establish (4), by aﬃliation of Vk and Xk it suﬃces to show that there exists N such that
for all N>N , the function b2:CN(z2) − b1:CN(z2) is non—decreasing in its arguments. But
since b1:CN(z2) converges to vmin and b2:CN(z2)c o n v e r g e st obu(z2)f o re a c hz2, there exists N




















But this implies that for N>N, b2:CN(z2) − b1:CN(z2) is non—decreasing in its arguments,
establishing (24).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
Observe ﬁrst that when FV is a step function (so that Vk takes a ﬁnite number of values),
the result follows from Theorem 4, via Theorem 2, as C∗
N is the ﬁnest possible ordering.





V (q)dq = V and let dxe denote the smallest integer at least as large as x.




V (q) a.s. (27)
Since Vk is bounded in [0,1], it follows from (1) and (2), via the dominated convergence theorem






Pick ε>0a n dl e t{ql}L









V (q)dq − ε = V − ε. (29)













































V (ql) > V − ε.
Since ε was arbitrary, this completes the proof.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4





0 =0 . For any h =1 ,...,H,
notice that the value of a good given that it is in category h is equally likely to be one of the
order statistics {VψN
h−1+1:N,...,V ψN









h−1+kN:N = vh]. (31)
Fix h and pick an ε ∈ (0,λ h). Pick δ ∈ (0, ελh















h−1+kN:N = vh]. (32)













so that by the Law of Large Numbers, limN→∞ Pr[VψN
h−1+kN:N = vh]=1 . Thus,
lim
N→∞









> 1 − ε (34)
20and we conclude that Vh:CN converges to vh in probability for all h =1 ,...,H.
Consequently, from (1), for all y2,z 3 such that fX|V (y2,y 2,z 3|vh) > 0, the winning bid
bh:CN(y2,z 3)m u s tc o n v e r g et ovh, so that limN→∞ E[Ph:CN|Vh:CN = vh]=vh. Furthermore,
as Vk ∈ [0,1], we must have
Pr[Vh:CN = vh]E[Ph:CN|Vh:CN = vh]+( 1− Pr[Vh:CN = vh]) ≥ E[Ph:CN] (35)
and
E[Ph:CN] ≥ Pr[Vh:CN = vh]E[Ph:CN|Vh:CN = vh]. (36)
Taking limits on both sides of (35) and (36) we conclude that limN→∞ E[Ph:CN]=vh for all
h =1 ,...,H and the result follows.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Recall from (24), that it is suﬃcient to prove that b2:CN(z2) − b1:CN(z2) is non—decreasing
in each argument. With z2 =( y2,z 3), let l(z2)=
fX|V (y2,y2,z3|1)
fX|V (y2,y2,z3|0) and observe that this is
non—decreasing in each argument, by aﬃliation. From (1) observe also that
b2:CN(z2) − b1:CN(z2)=
l(z2)λ2:CN
l(z2)λ2:CN +( 1− λ2:CN)
−
l(z2)λ1:CN
l(z2)λ1:CN +( 1− λ1:CN)
(37)





















λ . Furthermore, note that for λ<1
2 and any ordering with c2 = dλNe we
have c1 ≥ c2,a tl e a s tf o rN large. Since λ1:CN = E[max{0, Y −c2
c1 }]a n dλ2:CN = E[min{1, Y
c2}],
where E[Y ]=λN, by Jensen’s inequality we obtain
λ1:CN + λ2:CN = E[max{0,
Y − c2
c1















≥ 1. Since λ1:CN and λ2:CN are both decreasing in c2, we obtain the same
inequality for c2 > dλNe.
21We conclude that for all orderings satisfying (12), the right—hand side of (38) is greater
than or equal to 1−λ
λ for λ ≤ 1
2, for all N such that λN is an integer, and for N large enough





2, (38) holds and the result follows.
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